

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Office of the Deputy for the
Intelligence Community

27 February 1975

25X1

[redacted]
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Washington, D. C. 20506

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Dear [redacted]

STATINTL

I very much appreciated receiving the updated drafts and your notes, and it is obvious that you are all working hard to come out with a solid report. You asked that we review the paper for security issues, and we do find some problems. I suggest that when you are next in the building, you arrange to meet with [redacted] the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, to go over these issues.

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The section on covert action looks good to me, but I have asked [redacted] to take a look at it as well. I'm sure he will be in touch if he has any comments.

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I have talked with [redacted] and he will be sending us the final draft for formal comments, so we will not submit any formal comments now. [redacted] has encouraged our comments, just as you have, on an informal basis, and we spent some time on this with [redacted] here last week. [redacted] also had some specific comments on the paper, and I am attaching those to help you and [redacted] in the present redrafting.

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STATINTL

Sincerely,

STATINTL

[redacted]
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

24 February 1975

STATINTL MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Comments on Murphy Commission Draft Report

Introduction - no comments.

Section I, p. 8, last two lines of second para. - better words would be:

" . . . and as such is responsible for coordinating all foreign intelligence activities of the U. S. Government."

Section I, p. 10, lines 8 & 9 under DIA:

Director DIA is no longer program manager for GDIP and SRV.

ASD(I) now has these responsibilities.

Section I, p. 11 - Under NSA. Second para. is incorrect. The Service

Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs) are under the operational and technical control of Director, NSA. The SCA Chiefs also perform certain cryptologic related functions for their parent Services, for which they receive direction from the Service Chief. Some of these Service peculiar functions do involve maintenance of field units for direct support to military forces.

The relationship between NSA and the SCAs is not ambiguous.

Section I, p. 11 - NRO - I believe it is incorrect to describe NRO as a

part of "Air Force intelligence." It is not a part, either organizationally or in management and direction.

Section I, p. 12 - Many possible errors in fact or interpretation

under Service Intelligence para.

-- I question the source, validity and meaning of the large manpower figures given for Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence.

-- At least in the case of the Navy, it is totally incorrect to say that, "ONI employs about [REDACTED]. . ."

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-- Given the inaccuracy of these figures, it is wrong to say, in the second sentence, that "the three major Service agencies are all (SIC -- each) larger than DIA. (ONI, for example, actually has a world-wide strength of about [REDACTED])"

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-- It is also incorrect, as noted previously, to include NRO as a part of Air Force intelligence.

(Check accuracy of USIB Committee Chart)

Section II, p. 1, line 5 - change DCI to CIA.

Section III, p. 5, 2nd para. I understand the designation of the DCI

as vice Chairman of NSCIC has never been made official. Letter drafted but never signed.

Section III, p. 6, first line - strike out "director"

Section IV, p. 1, first para., last line - IRAC is "Resources" not "requirements"

Section V, p. 1, first para - This paragraph conveys a very wrong impression regarding the contribution of NSA, DIA and NRO (see last sentence) when one reads the second line, "Most of their effort is limited to 'tactical'" Perhaps use of word "much" in place of "most" would be easiest fix.

Section V, p. 2, lines 5-6 and 9-10 convey a misinterpretation.

"Tactical" or military force support intelligence elements are organic to forces as a part of the force enabling the Commander to execute his mission. They are not "nice to have" or "more comfortable" to the Commander as their reason for being, as this paragraph portrays.

The second para. is a non sequitur. The 15-85 split refers to "National" programs (Prog. III) and does not include "tactical" resources, which may be as much as double.

Section V, p. 3 - "Tactical" figures are available, as are all DOD budget items. All one needs to find "tactical" intelligence resource figures is a definition of what to include.

Section V, p. 5, NSA para., lines 4-6: I agree that military coverage dominates the SIGINT business, but I will not agree that this is "at the expense of other national needs" -- a connotation that other needs are not being met because of military dominance.
Not True.

Section V, NSA para., last sentence, again connotes **that** non-military needs are not being met because of military dominance. This is not true and is the fault of DCI and USIB if it **should** be true.

Section V, second para., lines 3-5. Comments on **further career** aspirations hampering objectivity of DIRNSA is **factually** wrong. Only one DIRNSA has ever been advanced in his Service, and only one other has been advanced outside his Service. All other retired, and one reverted to two-star status.

Section V, p.7, lines 2-4. The only position in NSA **traditionally** held by a military officer is the Director. All other senior positions do rotate and all have rotated among civilians and military.

Section V, p.7, second para., line 3 -- word "cryptographic" should be "cryptologic."

✓ Section V, last para. on p. 7 and first para. on p.8 are **grossly** misleading in impressions of relationships between NSA and SCAs plus role of Service Chiefs. This was explained in great detail to

Section V, p.8, 2nd para. regarding CSS. The CSS is **an** abortion and was deliberately engineered to be so by ASD(I) and a former Director of NSA.

Section V, p.13 - Remedies recommended to **improve the** Defense Attache System are of little value. Promotion **should** not be


treated as a reward for one tour of duty, as suggested. The real remedy for DAS problems is to improve the prestige and image of the Military Attache, and restore personnel reductions which have cut the system by more than half.

Section VI, p. 6, full para. at mid page:

Discussion equates HUMINT to clandestine HUMINT, which is wrong. Result is wrong conclusion and bad recommendation.

Section VII - no comments.


Section VIII - no comments.




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COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 25, 1975

STATINTL

[Redacted]

Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:


The Commission is planning to publish as annexes to its report eight of the analytical papers on intelligence. These papers will require a security review before publication which we request that you arrange.

In forwarding the documents we ask that you arrange for this review on an urgent basis since we are obligated to send the annexes to the printer no later than April 15 1975 to comply with our statutory filing time for the full report.

Wherever suggestions for deletion are made, we would appreciate it if appropriate substitute language can be suggested to fill in the gaps.

With many thanks,

Cordially,



Francis O. Wilcox
Executive Director

Enclosures: Papers by
Belcher
Macy
Barnds (2)
Huizenga
Lynn
Smith
Ransom

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[REDACTED]

STATINTL

I appreciated receiving the updated drafts and your notes, and it is apparent that you are all working very hard to get out a solid report. In general, I have no problem with the Covert Action Annex, but I have asked [REDACTED] to look at it again to ensure that there are no factual errors. On reading the paper, however, I have no feel for the depth of analysis that went in to support its conclusions nor can I understand whether you considered alternatives and on what grounds you dismissed them. This is particularly true of the draft on "Intelligence Structures." I appreciate that you have to write an open report and that maybe any in-depth effort in an analytical sense is a restriction problem.

STATINTL

[REDACTED] has gone over the draft and is offering some specific suggestions. I am attaching a copy of his paper for you.

You also asked whether these presented security problems. They do. I am attaching for you [REDACTED] paper as Chairman of the USIB Security Committee. STATINTL

For the time being, I have advised Bill Colby, on assurances from Fisher Howe and yourself, that we will be given an opportunity to review and comment formally on final drafts. Fisher called to tell me that the current drafts will continue to get major revisions and that while he welcomes any factual input we can provide along the way, we will have an opportunity to comment on whatever the Commission's final draft may be. Therefore, please consider the attached - except for the security questions - as an informal response to your letter.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

STATINTL

Associate Deputy to the DCI

Attachment 4

for the Intelligence Community

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~~Thanks again for your cooperation and help in this project. You know that the Director and my staff are very interested~~



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
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February 12, 1975

STATINTL



Office of the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.


Dear John:

Copies are enclosed of two draft sections of the Commission report which have been gone over and approved in substance by the Commissioners on the Intelligence and National Security Subcommittee. These are still subject to further adjustment, particularly by the staff.

It would be helpful if you would review them to insure that there are no classification problems with what has been written. Substantive comments off the record to me would also be welcome. Kindly keep in mind that this is still a rough draft, and I will polish up the language once I am sure the substance is acceptable and that I have not inadvertently included classified data.

Also enclosed is a revised cover sheet which I hope you will put on the historic review done by J.J. Hitchcock and myself.

Sincerely,



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Next 17 Page(s) In Document Exempt